January 23, 2013
Cameron’s intention was clearly that to appease his home electorate rather than scare the UK partners in Europe, but was it? It is unequivocal that when someone is forced to take a position (to show his cards) side effects come to the surface, unless –disgracefully- side effects come stronger than the intended “sedative”.
To say that a referendum will come between 2015 and 2017, i.e. after UK elections, is deviant and to narrate that much depends on the deal he will try to strike with the EU is, I believe, like beguiling a childish electorate.
But Mr. Cameron was right in declaring that “It was riskier to maintain the status quo than to change”. Indeed, the content of this sentence is –may be- the only aspect shared both by the UK and EU. The status quo would put the brakes to the two parties inexorably delaying the recovery and growth in Europe (UK-EU a Friendly Separation with Underwater Connection).
In actual fact, Mr. Cameron knows well that he does not control the purported negotiations with EU and the “after election” decisions are –today- shaped like a cloud in the sky. The EU have entry rules (accession terms) while rejection terms are free for anyone to accept. He laments lack of competitiveness but has he factually cooperated with the EU on this problem? Is placing vetoes on the long term budget a way to speed up decision making?
I don’t think there is scope for renegotiations in Brussels, if not probably, a renewed negotiation toward a realignment with all other members and thrive united out of this protracted financial crisis.